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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
------------------------------------------------------------------ X 
JEANNINE RENEE LAM 
' 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION, 
Defendant. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ X 
PAUL G. GARDEPHE, U.S.D.J.: 
MEMORANDUM 
OPINION & ORDER 
18 Civ. 2756 (PGG) 
In this action, pro se Plaintiff Jeannine Renee Lam alleges employment 
discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112 et seq, the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), New York Executive 
Law § 290 et seq.; and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), New York City 
Administrative Code§ 8-101 et seq. (See Dkt. No. I) Defendant is the New York City 
Department of Education ("DOE"). Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from anxiety, depression, 
degenerative spine or disk disease, and post-traumatic stress disorder, and that DOE 
discriminated-against her, failed to accommodate her disabilities, retaliated against her for 
engaging in protected activities, did not hire her for or promote her to more desirable positions, 
and created a hostile work environment based on her disabilities. 
DOE has moved to dismiss. 1 (See Dkt. No. 18) In a March 31, 2019 Order, this 
Court granted DOE's motion as to Plaintiffs NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims, but denied DOE's 
motion as to Plaintiffs ADA claims. (Dkt. No. 26) The purpose of this memorandum opinion is 
to explain the Court's reasoning. 
I. 
BACKGROUND2 
PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYMENT AT DOE 
Plaintiff is a special education teacher who has been employed by DOE since 
2001. (Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 8) ,r 1) While employed by DOE, Plaintiff has suffered from 
anxiety, depression, degenerative spine or disk disease, and post-traumatic stress disorder 
("PTSD"). (Id. at 4 & ,r 42; see also id. ,r,r 6, 22)3 During the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 school 
years, Plaintiff worked at I.S. 203 as a special education teacher. She was transferred to the 
Absent Teacher Reserve ("ATR") pool on September 26, 2016. (Id. ,r,r 4, 40) During her tenure 
at ATR, Plaintiff worked at four separate schools. (Id. at 27 & ir,r 41, 47, 52) 
A. I.S. 203 Assignment 
Plaintiff was hired as a special education teacher at LS. 203 on August 7, 2014. 
(Id. ,r 4) Her supervisor, Principal Leimsider, became aware of her anxiety issues ''right away." 
1 Although Defendant moved to dismiss claims under the Family Medical Leave Act and the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, the Amended Complaint alleges no such claims. 
(See Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 8) 
2 The facts are taken from the Amended Complaint, materials attached to the Amended 
Complaint, and allegations made in Plaintiffs opposition brief. While, "[i]n general, 'a court 
may not look outside the pleadings when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss[,] the 
mandate to read the papers of pro se litigants generously makes it appropriate to consider 
plaintiff's additional materials, such as h[ er] opposition memorandum."' Burgess v. Goord, No. 
98 Civ. 2077 (SAS), 1999 WL 33458, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1999) (quoting Gadson v. Goord, 
No. 96 Civ. 7544 (SS), 1997 WL 714878, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1997)). 
3 All references to page numbers are as reflected in this District's Electronic Case Filing System. 
2 
(Id. ,r 5) On October 7, 2014, the assistant principal observed Plaintiff in class and issued a 
"disappointing" evaluation that listed "areas needed for improvement." (Id. ,r 7) Plaintiff was 
observed again on December 18, 2014, and the results "reflected a significant decline in the 
evaluator ratings." (Id. ,r 10) On March 9, 2015, Plaintiff received a discipli11:ary letter related to 
absences from work, and on March 18, 2015, she received a disciplinary letter for being late to 
work. (Id. ,r,r 16, 20) 
On March 22, 2015, Plaintiff sent an email to the I.S. 203 principal and other staff 
informing them that her PTSD symptoms were worsening due to an increased workload. 
Plaintiff requested an immediate reduction in workload. (Id. ,r 22) On March 25, 2015, Principal 
Leimsider informed Plaintiff that the school had received a letter alleging that Plaintiff had used 
corporal punishment on her students; Plaintiff maintains that these allegations are false. (Id. ,r 
24) The next day Plaintiff took a Restoration of Health Leave from work due to her "anxiety," 
which she claims was precipitated by the principal's alleged retaliatory acts. ilil, 25) 
While on leave, Plaintiff took muscle relaxants to address her PTSD symptoms, 
and she received counseling to manage her emotions. (Id. ,r 26) During Plaintiffs leave, 
Principal Leimsider contacted her on multiple occasions to schedule a disciplinary hearing 
concerning the corporal punishment allegations. (Id. ,r,r 24, 27) 
At the beginning of the 2015-2016 school year, Plaintiff contacted Principal 
Kotzer, who had replaced Principal Leimsider, who had retired. Plaintiff explained her 
disabilities and discussed ideas for how to minimize her PTSD symptoms at work. (Id. ,r 29) On 
October 23, 2015, three administrators observed Plaintiff co-teach a lesson. Plaintiff received a 
poor evaluation rating, while her co-teacher received a "highly effective" evaluation for the same 
lesson. (Id. ,r 30) 
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On November 19, 2015, Principal Kotzer brought charges against Plaintiff under 
New York Education Law§ 3020-a.4 (Id. ,r 32) Plaintiff alleges that the investigation preceding 
these formal charges occurred while she "was on a reported medical leave." (MJ On December 
7, 2015, Plaintiff was removed from the classroom and "placed in solitary, mini-rubber room 
confinement" at LS. 204. (Id. ,r 34) Plaintiff "remained there until [she] was assigned as a 
teacher in A TR." (MJ 
On May 17, 20 I 6, Plaintiff applied for an ADA accommodation, and requested 
that she be assigned a permanent placement in a classroom. (Id. ,r 35) On July 20, 2016, 
Plaintiff was informed that her accommodation request for a permanent placement in a 
classroom "was denied by the NYDOE Medical Unit." (Id. ,r 39) 
On June 27, 20 I 6, Plaintiff sent an email to Principal Kotzer stating that she 
would be absent from work because of an unexpected emergency involving her mother. (Id. 
,r 37) Principal Kotzer instructed Plaintiff to report to work, stating that "[Plaintiff] should have 
learned from previous mistakes." (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff suffered an anxiety attack, and did 
not report to work. (Id.) On July 27, 2016, Plaintiff applied for FMLA leave regarding her June 
27, 2016 absence. Plaintiffs request was denied. (Id. ,r 38) 
B. Absent Teacher Reserve Pool Assignment 
Plaintiff was transferred to the Absent Teacher Reserve pool on September 26, 
2016 and assigned to LS. 126. (Id. ,r,r 40-41) On September 29, 2016, LS. 126 Principal 
Alexander Angueira sent an email to ATR assignment personnel "formally requesting that 
[Plaintiffl not be assigned to [his] school again." (Id. ,r 43; see also id. at 31) In the email, 
4 The Amended Complaint does not disclose the nature of the charges against Plaintiff, but the 
statute cited by Plaintiff concerns disciplinary procedures and penalties for tenured teachers in 
New York. 
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Angueira explained that Plaintiff had told him that she suffers from PTSD, and that "it is 
triggered when she is around children[,] [ e ]specially when they misbehave." (Id. at 31) In the 
email, Angueira also reports that Plaintiff had told him that her assignment the previous day had 
"aggravated her body and sent it into spasms. She also stated that her left arm has been affected 
due to the fact that the doors in [Angueira's school] are too heavy for her to open." (Id.) 
Principal Angueira stated that Plaintiff was "not a fit for [his] Special Education vacancy," 
because he did "not have a program that doesn't involve being in front of students and opening 
and closing doors." (Id.) 
In response, "A TR Assignment" sent an email stating: 
Ms. Lam should be treated as any full time staff member and summoned to a 
disciplinary conference to address her issue. She should be provided 48 hours' 
notice of the conference in order to obtain union representation. Once the 
conference is held kindly fax the documentation to this unit at 718 935 2417(.] 
[O]nce received we can look into creating an exception from future assignments 
to your location. Without a letter we are unable to prevent future assignments to 
your school. 
(Id.) After this exchange, "Principal Angueira refrained from assigning any work for [Plaintiff] 
to do. Instead, he had [Plaintiffj wait in the teacher's lounge." (Id. ,i 44) 
On October 13, 2016, citing Plaintiffs "Personal Medical Information," 
"Principal Angueira filed a request for [Plaintiff] to have a Mandated Medical Evaluation 
(Education Law Section 2568)." (Id. ,r 46) 
On November 14, 2016, Plaintiff was assigned to I.S. 85. · (Id. ,r 47) After a week 
at that location, Plaintiff told Principal Chang that - "on days when [she] was required to send 
students [home] with people who were strangers to [Plaintiff]" - her PTSD symptoms became 
"exacerbated." (Id. ,i 48) At a staff meeting ten minutes later, Principal Chang asked the 
assistant principal "to take back [from Plaintiff] all of the paperwork provided to everyone at the 
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staff meeting," explaining that Plaintiff"was not a part of the permanent staff." (Id. ,r 49) On 
November 22, 2016, Principal Chang "notified the superintendent that she was 'concerned about 
having [Plaintiff] around the students."' (Id. at 21) On November 29, 2016, citing Plaintiff's 
"Personal Medical Information," Principal Chang "filed a request for [Plaintiff] to have a 
"Mandated Medical Evaluation," pursuant to Education Law § 2568. (Id. ,r 50) 
On December 19, 2016, Plaintiff was assigned to P.S. 2. (Id. ,r 52) Plaintiff 
informed Principal Goldman in writing of her "severe anxiety" before starting at P.S. 2. (ill 
On December 21, 2016, Plaintiff attended the Mandatory Medical Evaluation and 
was deemed "FIT.'' (Id. ,r 53) That same day, she received an email stating that the DOE "'will 
be supplementing its supervision [of her] in the Absent Teacher Reserve (ATR) pool.'" 
Plaintiff requested a laptop and smartboard for use at P.S. 2, but on January 9, 
2017, Principal Goldman informed Plaintiff that she could not use these resources in the 
classroom. (Id. ir 54) 
On January 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Id. ,r,r 55, 58) The same day, Principal 
Goldman denied Plaintiffs request to "attend the School Leadership Team Meeting (SLT), a 
group of teachers, parents and administrators." (Id. ,r 56) Instead, Principal Goldman instructed 
Plaintiff to report to a kindergarten classroom. (Id. ,r 57) 
On January 13, 2017, "Principal Goldman called [Plaintiff] to a disciplinary 
meeting with claims of insubordination and interruption of work." (Id. ,r 59) Goldman claimed 
that Plaintiff had interfered with the kindergarten teachers' preparation of a parent newsletter. 
(Id. ir 59) Plaintiff complained that one of the kindergarten teachers had harassed her, but the 
principal "disregarded [Plaintiffs] claims of harassment." (Id. ,r,r 57, 60) 
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About twenty minutes later, Plaintiff asked "to be relieved of [her] upcoming 
coverage of a Kindergarten class." (Id. -i! 61) "Principal Goldman demanded [that Plaintiff] 
punch out and go home if [she] wasn't going to report to [her kindergarten) assignment." (Id.) 
"Out of fear of further accusations of insubordination, [Plaintiff] promptly reported to [her] 
assigned (class] and neglected [her] own anxiety." (Id.) 
On January 18, 2017, Principal Goldman summoned Plaintiff to another 
disciplinary meeting concerning allegations that Plaintiff had been recording students. (Id. ,r 62) 
That san1e day, the ATR Assignment Unit told Plaintiff "to report to a new school the next day 
due to Principal Goldman's disciplinary actions." (Id. ,I 63) Later that day, Plaintiff took a 
Restoration of Health Leave because her anxiety had disrupted her sleep and eating habits. 
Plaintiff remained on leave until January 27, 2017. (Id. ,r 64; Pltf. Opp. (Dkt. No. 22) at 4) 
While Plaintiff was on leave, Principal Goldman contacted her to schedule a 
disciplinary meeting concerning the allegations that she had recorded students. (Am. Cmplt. -ii 
64) On February 3, 2017, after Plaintiff had returned from leave, a disciplinary proceeding was 
conducted. As a result of that proceeding, "a disciplinary letter was put in [Plaintiffs] file by 
P.S. 2 Principal Goldman with an accusation that Chancellor's Regulation A-820 Confidentiality 
and Release of Student Records; Records retention, was violated." (Id. 'ii 65) 
On February 6, 2017, Plaintiff was assigned to P.S. 69. (Id. at 27) 
Since being assigned to the A TR pool, Plaintiff has applied for various permanent 
teacher placements, but has not been selected. (Id. at 27) Plaintiff received satisfactory 
evaluations from her field supervisor during the 2016-2017 school year, but her annual 
performance rating was "Unsatisfactory" due to the disciplinary letters filed by Principal 
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Goldman at P.S. 2. (Id. ir,r 67-68) Plaintiff has received satisfactory evaluations from her field 
supervisor during the 2017-2018 school year. (Id. ,r 69) 
DISCUSSION 
I. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard 
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, plaintiff must provide grounds 
upon which her claim rests through "factual allegations sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above 
the speculative level."' ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87,' 98 (2d Cir. 
2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, the 
complaint must allege "'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Starr 
v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 592 F.3d 314,321 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
In applying this standard, a court accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations 
but does not credit "mere conclusory statements" or "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 
cause of action." Id. Moreover, a court will give "no effect to legal conclusions couched as 
factual allegations." Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Ne., Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 
2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Where a court can infer no more than the mere 
possibility of misconduct from the factual averments - in other words, where the well-pied 
allegations of a complaint have not "nudged [plaintiff's] claims across the line from conceivable 
to plausible" - dismissal is appropriate. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
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"In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to 
the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint." DiFolco 
v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Chambers v. Time Warner, 
Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002); Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir. 
1999) ). "Where a document is not incorporated by reference, the court may never[ the ]less 
consider it where the complaint 'relies heavily upon its terms and effect,' thereby rendering the 
document 'integral' to the complaint." DiFolco, 622 F.3d at 111 (quoting Mangiafico v. 
Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391,398 (2d Cir. 2006)). For a document to be integral to a complaint, 
"the plaintiff must have ( 1) 'actual notice' of the extraneous information and (2) 'relied upon 
th[e] document[] in framing the complaint."' DeLuca v. AssetIT Grp., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 54, 
60 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (first alteration in original) (quoting Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153). 
A district court may also "rely on matters of public record in deciding a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 
1998); see also Blue Tree Hotels Inv. (Can.), Ltd. v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, 
Inc., 369 F.3d 212,217 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[W]e may also look to public records ... in deciding a 
motion to dismiss."). "In the motion to dismiss context, ... a court should generally take judicial 
notice 'to determine what statements [ the documents] contain[ ] ... not for the truth of the 
matters asserted."' Schubert v. City of Rye, 775 F. Supp. 2d 689,698 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, "the submissions of a pro se litigant must be 
construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Triestman 
v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471,474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and alterations 
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omitted); see also Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that prose 
litigants "generally are entitled to a liberal construction of their pleadings, which should be read 
'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest"' (quoting Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 
79 (2d Cir. 1996))). That said, a pro se plaintiff must still plead enough facts to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011). 
Although courts are "obligated to draw the most favorable inferences" from a complaint, they 
"cannot invent factual allegations that [plaintiff] has not pled." Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 
162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). 
B. Disability Discrimination Under the ADA 
Section 102(a) of the ADA creates a private right of action for disability-based 
employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112. Claims of disability discrimination under 
the ADA are governed by the three-step burden shifting framework set out in McDonnell 
Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff 
must first establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. If plaintiff meets this burden, 
defendant must rebut the prima facie case of discrimination by producing a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory action. Where a defendant rebuts 
plaintiffs prima facie case, the burden then shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate that defendant's 
stated justification for an adverse employment action is merely pretext, and that the real reason 
for the adverse action is discrimination. See Tex. Dep't of Crnty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 253-56 (1981 ). Such discrimination can manifest itself in a variety of ways, including by a 
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failure to accommodate, retaliating against an employee for engaging in a protected activity, and 
creating a hostile work environment. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Allegations Premised on Pre-March 16, 2016 Conduct 
The ADA "require[s] claimants to file a charge of discrimination or retaliation 
with the EEOC within three hundred days of the discriminatory or retaliatory act." Apionishev 
v. Columbia Univ., No. 09 Civ. 6471 (SAS), 2011 WL 1197637, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2011). 
'"[C]laims regarding acts that occurred more than three hundred days prior to the employee's 
initiation of administrative review are thus time-barred.'" Id. (quoting Klein v. N.Y. Univ., No. 
07 Civ. 0160 (RLC), 2008 WL 3843514, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2008)). "An exception exists 
for claims that the discriminatory acts were part of a continuing policy and practice of prohibited 
discrimination," Valtchev v. City ofN.Y., 400 F. App'x 586,588 (2d Cir. 2010), but this 
doctrine is "heavily disfavored in the Second Circuit and courts have been loath to apply it 
absent a showing of compelling circumstances." Trinidad v. N.Y.C. Dep't-of Corr., 423 F. Supp. 
2d 151, 165 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "'multiple 
incidents of discrimination, even similar ones, that are not the result of a discriminatory policy or 
mechanism do not amount to a continuing violation."' Valtchev, 400 F. App'x at 588-89 
(quoting Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on January 10, 2017. 
(Am. Cmplt. ,i 55) DOE argues that liability cannot be predicated on conduct that took ~lace 
before March 16, 2016 - more than 300 days before Plaintiffs EEOC complaint. See 
Tewksbury v. Ottaway Newspapers, 192 F.3d 322,325 (2d Cir. 1999). Plaintiff does not dispute 
DOE's analysis but says that she included the pre-March 16, 2016 allegations "as background 
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information." (Pltf. Opp. (Dkt. No. 22) at 2) Accordingly, Plaintiffs ADA claims are dismissed 
to the extent they are predicated on pre-March 16, 2016 conduct. 
B. ADA Claims 
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must 
establish "(a) that his employer is subject to the ADA; (b) th.at he is disabled within the meaning 
of the ADA or perceived to be so by his employer; ( c) that he was otherwise qualified to perform 
the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; and ( d) that he 
suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability." Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2008). 
Here, DOE argues that Plaintiffs ADA claims fail because: (1) she is not 
disabled under the ADA; (2) she is not able to perform the essential functions of the ATR 
position with or without an accommodation; (3) her accommodation request - a permanent 
classroom assignment notwithstanding her ATR status - is unreasonable; ( 4) she has not 
"allege[ d] sufficient facts to establish any inference of discrimination"; (5) she "does not link any 
alleged harassment sufficiently to her disability to show that she suffered a hostile work 
environment"; and (6) she does not "sufficiently plead a causal connection between her protected 
activity and any alleged adverse employment action to show retaliation." (Def. Br. (Dkt No. 20) 
at 15-16) 
1. ADA Disability 
DOE argues that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pied that "[s]he is disabled within 
the meaning of the ADA." Brady, 531 F.3d at 134. Under the ADA, an individual is disabled if 
he or she: (1) has "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activities"; (2) has "a record of such an impairment"; or (3) is "regarded as having such an 
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impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1);' accord Widomski v. State Univ. ofN.Y. at Orange, 748 
F.3d 471,474 (2d Cir. 2014). "Not every impairment is a 'disability' within the meaning of the 
ADA; rather, there are two requirements: the impairment must limit a major life activity and the 
limitation must be substantial." Capobianco v. City of N.Y., 422 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2005). 
Major life activities are "'activities that are of central importance to daily life.'" Id. (quoting 
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002)). They "include, but are not 
limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, 
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, 
thinking, communicating, and working." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Moreover, although a 
plaintiff has a minimal burden in establishing a prima facie case, the above terms are to be 
"interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled." Toyota, 534 U.S. 
at 197; accord Troeger v. Ellenville Cent. Sch. Dist., 523 F. App'x 848,852 (2d Cir. 2013). 
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from PTSD, anxiety, degenerative spine 
disease, and chronic depression (see Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 8) at 4 & ,I 42; Pltf. Opp. (Dkt. No. 
22) at 4), and that these conditions substantially limit her mobility and ability to sleep, walk, and 
lift. (See Pltf. Opp. (Dkt. No. 22) at 4, 10) She states that those major life activities are 
interrupted "due to the exacerbation of chronic degenerative spine disease during PTSD 
episodes." (Id. at 4) 
DOE contends that because Plaintiff did not cite these "major life activities" in 
the Amended Complaint or "attach relevant documentation," her allegations are insufficient. 
(Def. Reply (Dkt. No. 24) at 8) As discussed above, however, this Court is required to liberally 
construe a pro se plaintiffs allegations and may consider her opposition brief in determining the 
sufficiency of her allegations. See,~, Perez v. Ponte, 236 F. Supp. 3d 590, 633 (E.D.N.Y. 
13 
2017). Moreover, a plaintiff alleging disability discrimination is not required to attach any 
particular documentation to her complaint. Factual allegations in the complaint are sufficient 
where they are well-pleaded. See,~' Amaker v. Goord, No. 98 Civ. 3634 (JGK), 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 7562, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2000) ("allegations are sufficient to survive a 
motion to dismiss"). 
Although DOE argues that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that her major life 
activities were "exacerbated by the rotation of her teaching assignments" (Def. Reply (Dkt. No. 
24) at 8), Plaintiff has alleged that the rotation of her teaching assignments has exacerbated her 
PTSD, which limits several major life activities. 5 The Court concludes that Plaintiffs 
allegations are sufficient to plead that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 
2. Essential Functions 
DOE also argues that Plaintiff cannot perform the essential functions of the A TR 
assignment. "Essential functions" refers to the '"fundamental' duties to be performed in the 
position in question." Stone v. City of Mt. Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l) (1996)). ADA regulations note that a function "may be essential because 
the reason the position exists is to perform that function." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i). 
"Although a court will give considerable deference to an employer's 
determination as to what functions are essential, there are a number of relevant factors that may 
influence a court's ultimate conclusion as to a position's essential functions." McMillan v. City 
5 See Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 8) ,r 35 (alleging that Plaintiff requested a permanent placement 
because her rotation from school to school had increased her anxiety); id. at 27 (alleging that 
Plaintiff requested an accommodation of a permanent placement because her symptoms have 
been exacerbated by frequent reassignments to different schools); Pltf. Opp. (Dkt. No. 22) at 4, 
10 ( contending that "several major life activities [have been] interrupted, such as sleep ... 
walking and lifting ... due to the exacerbation of chronic degenerative spine disease during 
PTSD episodes"). 
14 
ofN.Y., 711 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Stone, 118 F.3d at 97 (relevant factors to 
consider include "[t]he employer's judgment," "[w]rittenjob descriptions," "[t]he amount of 
time spent on the job performing the function," "[t]he terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement," "[t]he work experience of past [employees] in the job," and the "work experience of 
[current employees] in similar jobs" (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n))). "Usually no one listed 
factor will be dispositive .... " Stone, 118 F.3d at 97. Moreover, a court must avoid deciding 
cases based on "unthinking reliance on intuition about the methods by which jobs are to be 
performed." Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1995). Instead, a 
court must conduct "a fact-specific inquiry into both the employer's description of a job and how 
the job is actually performed in practice." Id. 
DOE argues that Plaintiff "cannot perform the essential functions of her 
employment as an ATR" because that position necessarily requires "rotating to assignments and 
... working with school children."6 (Def. Br. (Dkt. No. 20) at 18) 
In arguing that Plaintiff cannot perform the essential functions of the A TR 
position, DOE relies on Principal Angueira's September 29, 2016 email- set forth in the 
Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 8) at 31 & ~ 43) - in which Angueira reports to ATR Assignment 
personnel that Plaintiff told him that she suffers from PTSD and that "it is triggered when she is 
around children[,] [e]specially when they misbehave." (Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 8) at 31) 
According to Angueira, Plaintiff also said that doors at the school were "too heavy for her to 
open," and that her efforts to open doors at the school had caused injury to her left arm. mlJ 
6 Elsewhere DOE directly contradicts this assertion, arguing that "Plaintiff ... alleges facts ... 
suggesting she is fully capable of working as an ATR without accommodation." (Def. Br. (Dkt. 
No. 20) at 20) 
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Although Plaintiff quotes Principal Angueira's email in the Amended Complaint 
- when Plaintiff's allegations are read liberally- it is clear that she disputes his conclusion that 
she cannot perform the essential functions of an A TR at his school. In the Amended Complaint, 
Plaintiff asserts that - while trying to open a heavy stairway exit door - she exacerbated her disc 
bulges. Plaintiff reported this injury to Principal Angueira, and he then requested that she not be 
assigned to his school again, because he did not have a teacher position that did not involve 
"opening and closing doors," and so she was not "a fit for [his] Special Education vacancy." 
(Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 8) 11 42-43) He then refused to assign any other work to Plaintiff, and 
instructed her to sit in the teacher's lounge. (See id. 144) 
In her opposition brief, Plaintiff states that she had reported her PTSD symptoms 
to Principal Angueira and provided him with "Personal Health Information," and that his 
immediate response was that she should "find another career because of the stressful nature of 
teaching, implying that someone with PTSD could not manage to work in the education system." 
(Pltf. Opp. (Dkt. No. 22) at 7) Plaintiff refused to quit, however, and Principal Angueira then 
assigned her to sit in the teachers' lounge. According to Plaintiff, in requesting that she be 
reassigned, Principal Angueira did not give Plaintiff "the opportunity to prove" to him that she 
was able to teach. (Id.) 
DOE also relies on Principal Gordon-Chang's Medical Evaluation Request, in 
which Gordon-Chang writes: "[Plaintiff] stated that dropping off and picking up students in 
different parts of the building increases her 'severe' anxiety" and "[a]ny type of schedule change 
is problematic" such that it "may affect how she works with students." (Blair Deel. (Dkt. No. 
19) Ex. 3) Construing Plaintiff's allegations liberally and interpreting them to raise the strongest 
16 
arguments they suggest, this evidence does not demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot be around 
children, as Defendant argues. 
In sum, reading Plaintiffs allegations liberally, she reported her PTSD symptoms 
and her injury opening the door to Principal Angueira, but did not tell him that her PTSD 
prevented her from being around misbehaving children. Plaintiff likewise reported to Principal 
Gordon-Chang that she suffered from severe anxiety under certain circumstances, because she 
was afraid that her medical condition would affect her work. Plaintiff did not tell Principal 
Gordon-Chang that she could not work with children. Moreover, Plaintiff has pled facts 
demonstrating that she has been successful in her most recent ATR assignment at P.S. 69, and 
has received satisfactory reviews for the 2016-17 and 2017-18 school years. (Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. 
No. 8) ,r,r 67, 69) Accordingly, the gist of Plaintiffs ADA claims is that she is fully capable of 
teaching with a reasonable accommodation limiting intra-day transfers to distant classrooms. 
(Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 8) ,r,r 66-67, 69) 
DOE also argues (Def. Br. (Dkt. No. 20) at 19) that Plaintiff has alleged that she 
cannot perform her job if she must rotate from one school to another. The allegations DOE cite 
relate to daily schedule changes, however, where Plaintiff "often each period, [is made to] travel 
... from the 5th floor to the outdoor Pre-K portables back to back." (Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 8) at 
27) DOE does not contend that an "essential function" of the ATR position is the ability to 
change locations from one hour to the next, and to travel five floors in between class periods. 
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that 
she can perform the essential job functions of the ATR position. 
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3. Accommodation Request 
DOE argues that Plaintiff does not need an accommodation to perform the ATR 
position, and that the accommodation she seeks - a permanent classroom placement - is 
unreasonable. 
"The ADA ... require[s] an employer to afford reasonable accommodation of an 
employee's known disability unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
employer." Noll v. Int'l. Bus. Mach. Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2015). To prevail on a 
failure to accommodate claim under the ADA, plaintiff must show that: 
"(I) [she] is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2) an 
employer covered by the statute had notice of [her] disability; (3) with reasonable 
accommodation, [the employee] could perform the essential functions of the job 
at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such accommodations." 
Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., Inc., 583 
F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
"In the context of the ADA, reasonable accommodation may include, inter alia, 
modification of job duties and schedules .... " McBride, 583 F.3d at 97 (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 121 l 1(9)(B)). '"Employees are not entitled to hold out for the most beneficial 
accommodation, [however,] and [an] employer need not offer the accommodation that the 
employee prefers. Instead, when any reasonable accommodation is provided, the statutory 
inquiry ends."' Turowski v. Triarc Co., 761 F. Supp. 2d 107, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Waltzer v. Triumph Apparel Corp., No. 09 Civ. 288 (DLC), 2010 
WL 565428, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2010)). That being said, '"[o]rdinarily, questions of 
reasonableness are best left to the fact finder."' Baker v. The Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 548 
(2d Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting EEOC v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 914 F.2d 71, 73 
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(5th Cir. 1990)); see also Noll, 787 F.3d at 94 ("The reasonableness of an employer's 
accommodation is a 'fact-specific' question that often must be resolved by a factfinder."). 
Here, DOE disputes only the third element of the reasonable accommodation 
inquiry, arguing that because Plaintiff alleges that "she has been able to succeed at [P.S. 69]" and 
that it is a "good fit," "no accommodation [is] required." (Def. Br. (Dkt. No. 20) at 20 (citing 
Harvin v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., No. 14 Civ. 5125 (CBA), 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56759, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018)) But Plaintiffs accommodation 
request relates to her allegations that in prior assignments her schedule has changed from class to 
class, and that she has been transferred from one school to the next multiple times within a 
school year. Acknowledging Plaintiffs allegations that she has more recently been in a more 
stable position at P.S. 69, those allegations do not negate Plaintiffs claims that her 
accommodation requests were previously denied. Nor does DOE argue that Plaintiffs currently 
stable position at P.S. 69 is permanent in nature. Indeed, DOE repeatedly notes that Plaintiffs 
assignment is subject to "change daily." (Def. Br. (Dkt. No. 20) at 20) Accordingly, Plaintiffs 
reasonable accommodation claim will not be dismissed on the ground that no accommodation is 
necessary. 
DOE also argues that Plaintiffs request for a "permanent placement in an 
elementary classroom rather than being moved around to numerous new work environments" 
(see Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 8) ~ 35) is unreasonable, because it would eliminate the essential 
function of her ATR position, namely that "ATR schedules are, by nature, not consistent day to 
day." (Def. Br. (Dkt. No. 20) at 24) To the extent Plaintiff is requesting a permanent placement, 
the Court finds that this request is incompatible with her A TR position. However, Plaintiff first 
requested a permanent placement on May 17, 2016, long before she was assigned to A TR on 
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September 26, 2016. Accordingly, her accommodation request seeking a permanent placement 
is sufficient to the extent it was made prior to her assignment to A TR. 
Plaintiff also alleges that she has had a more stable, consistent schedule as an 
ATR at P.S. 69. Accordingly, her accommodation request can reasonably be read to seek less 
change. For example, Plaintiff alleges that daily schedule changes - where she "often each 
period [is made to] travel ... from the 5th floor to the outdoor Pre-K portables back to back" 
(Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 8) at 27)- exacerbates her medical conditions. To the extent that 
Plaintiff requests an assignment that does not involve daily schedule changes, Defendant has not 
shown that such an accommodation request is unreasonable or would impose undue hardship. 
Indeed, a modification in work schedule is a classic reasonable accommodation. 11&, Rodal v. 
Anesthesia Grp. of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 2004) ("A modified work 
schedule may constitute a reasonable accommodation in certain circumstances."). Finally, the 
reasonableness of Plaintiffs request presents a fact-specific inquiry that is not suitable for 
adjudication at the motion to dismiss stage. 11&, Noll, 787 F.3d at 94. For all these reasons, 
Plaintiffs ADA claim will not be dismissed on the grounds that she seeks an accommodation 
that is unreasonable. 
4. Adverse Employment Action 
DOE argues that Plaintiffs ADA claim fails because she has not suffered an 
adverse employment action due to her disability. "To constitute an adverse employment action 
in the context of a discrimination claim, an action must cause 'a materially adverse change in the 
terms and conditions of employment."' Henry v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 
396,404 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
'"To be materially adverse, a change in working conditions must be more disruptive than a mere 
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inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. Examples of such a change include 
termination of employment, a _demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less 
distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, 
or other indices unique to a particular situation."' Id. ( quoting Mathirampuzha, 548 F .3d at 78). 
Moreover, to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must include allegations that the 
adverse employment action '"took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of 
discrimination."' Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 804 F.3d 231,234 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Graham v. Long Isl. R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
In the Amended Complaint and in her opposition, Plaintiff lists the following 
post-March 16, 2016 adverse employment actions she suffered as a result of her disability: (1) 
Plaintiff was not provided with an assignment schedule, even though other tenured Special 
Education teachers received an assignment schedule (see Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 8) at 21); (2) 
while at P.S. 85, Plaintiff was not given a copy of the school's safety procedures (see id. 149); 
(3) Plaintiff was deprived of building-level seniority benefits (see id.); (4) Plaintiff was 
transferred from schools at principals' request (see id. 1143, 63); (5) Plaintiff suffered retaliation 
after voicing concerns about the safety of students (see id. 1148-49); (6) Plaintiff was denied the 
use of certain resources, such as a laptop and smartboard (see id. 154); (7) Plaintiff suffered 
diminished material responsibilities when placed on "lunchroom duties" and assigned to the 
teacher's lounge (see id. at 28 and 134); (8) Plaintiff was issued unwarranted disciplinary letters 
on January 13, 2017 and February 3, 2017 (see id. 1159-60, 62, 65); (9) Plaintiff was given an 
"unsatisfactory" rating (see id. 168); (10) Plaintiff was not able to earn "per session 
remuneration" due to her "unsatisfactory" rating" (see id.; see also id. at 6); and (11) Plaintiff 
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was not hired as "a permanent non-ATR Special Education teacher." (See id. at 27-28 & ~~ 39, 
61; Pltf. Opp. (Dkt. No. 22) at 10-11)7 
DOE does not dispute that the first five actions cited above constitute adverse 
employment actions. As for DOE's failure to supply Plaintiff with a laptop and smartboard, 
DOE argues that this claim amounts to nothing more than "mere inconvenience." Sanders v. 
N.Y.C. Human Resources Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir. 2004). Courts have held that 
where the equipment at issue is desirable, but the job can be performed without it; the failure to 
provide the desired equipment does not constitute an adverse employment action. Demoret v. 
Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that assignment of a Jeep rather than a Ford 
was not an adverse employment action); Ray v. N.Y. State Ins. Fund, No. 16 Civ. 2895 (NRB), 
2018 WL 3475467, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2018) (holding that "the refusal to replace 
[plaintiffs] chair does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action"); Lee v. Healthfirst, 
Inc., No. 04 Civ. 8787 (THK), 2007 WL 634445, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2007) (assignment of 
older model of car and cell phone was not an adverse employment action); Wells-Williams v. 
Kingsboro Psychiatric Ctr., No. 03 Civ. 134 (CBA), 2007 WL 1011545, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 
30, 2007) (assignment of adequate but less desirable kitchen knives to chef was a "mere 
inconvenience" and not an adverse employment action). Plaintiff does not allege that the laptop 
and smartboard were essential to her job performance. Accordingly, DOE's failure to supply 
these materials does not constitute an adverse employment action. 
As to Plaintiffs claim that she was not hired as a permanent non-A TR Special 
Education teacher, DOE argues that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts. But in her 
7 Plaintiff also lists the denial of her request for a reasonable accommodation. That claim is 
discussed above. 
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opposition, Plaintiff argues that she "was rejected as a candidate [for a Special Education teacher 
vacancy] once Principal [Angueira became] aware of her disability[,] and ultimately she was not 
hired through this process." (Pltf. Br. (Dkt. No. 22) at 11-12) The Court concludes that 
Plaintiff's allegations on this point are sufficient to plead an adverse employment action. E.g., 
Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 720 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[Plaintiff]'s claim of 
discriminatory failure to promote falls within the core activities encompassed by the term 
'adverse actions."'). 
As for Plaintiff's allegations that she suffered a "change in responsibilities," DOE 
argues that because Plaintiff's "job duties and assignments [are] inherently at the discretion of 
DOE" - due to her being an ATR - her assignment to the teacher's lounge and the cafeteria 
without any pedagogical responsibilities does not constitute an adverse employment action. 
Significantly diminished material responsibilities are a classic example of a materially adverse 
employment action, however, and DOE does not argue otherwise. Henry, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 404 
(noting that '" significantly diminished material responsibilities"' constitute a materially adverse 
employment action (quoting Mathirampuzha, 548 F.3d at 78)); see also La Grande v. 
DeCrescente Distributing Co., 370 F. App'x 206, 211 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that "barring 
[plaintiff] from the training [provided to other employees] diminished his material 
responsibilities or opportunities"). 
Finally, DOE argues that the disciplinary letters issued to Plaintiff and the 
"unsatisfactory" rating do not constitute adverse employment actions, and that Plaintiff's 
complaint that she cannot earn per session remuneration is misplaced, because she is not eligible 
for such compensation under DOE regulations. (Def. Reply (Dkt. No. 20) at 11-12) The Court 
agrees that the disciplinary letters and the "unsatisfactory" rating do not constitute adverse 
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employment actions. See Gordon v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 Civ. 9265 (SAS), 2003 WL 
169800, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2003) ("It is well-settled that negative evaluations alone, 
without any accompanying adverse consequences, such as a demotion, diminution of wages, or 
other tangible loss, do not constitute adverse employment actions." (collecting cases)). 
As to Plaintiffs complaint regarding per session remuneration, Defendant is 
correct that Plaintiff is not eligible for such compensation due to her reassignment to A TR. See 
Chancellor's Regulation C-175, available at https://www.schools.nyc.gov/docs/default-
source/default-document-library/c-175-english. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs 
discrimination claim is based on her assignment to A TR, that is insufficient. See, ~. Torres v. 
N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 18 Civ. 2156 (NGG), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82897, at *17 
(E.D.N.Y. May 14, 2019) ("The mere placement of Plaintiff in the ATR does not constitute an 
adverse employment action for purposes of a discrimination or retaliation claim." ( collecting 
cases)). Accordingly, the allegations concerning these matters are insufficient to plead adverse 
employment actions. 
5. Retaliation 
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: 
(1) [s]he engaged in an activity protected by the ADA; (2) [the defendant was] 
aware of this activity; (3) [the defendant] took adverse ... action against h[er]; 
and (4) a causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and the 
protected activity. 
Treglia, 313 F.3d at 719. 
In the context of a retaliation claim, "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable 
employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, 'which in this context 
means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination."' Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quoting 
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Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); see also Welch v. United Parcel 
Service, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 164, 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ("An action is deemed 'adverse' within 
the meaning of the ADA if it is the type of action that 'could well dissuade' a reasonable person 
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."). 
Here, in connection with Plaintiffs EEOC charge, DOE argues that Plaintiff has 
not pled facts demonstrating that DOE was "aware of this activity." (Def. Br. (Dkt. No. 20) at 
24-25) Plaintiff does not dispute DOE's claim, and the Court agrees that the Amended 
Complaint does not allege that the DOE learned of Plaintiffs EEOC complaint. Accordingly, to 
the extent Plaintiffs retaliation claim rests on her filing of an EEOC complaint, the claim is 
insufficient. 
More broadly, DOE contends that Plaintiff has not pled facts that "establish a 
causal connection between her protected activity and the alleged retaliation actions." (Id. at 25) 
But Plaintiff alleges - both in the Amended Complaint's factual allegations and in documents 
attached to the Amended Complaint that were submitted to the EEOC - that her supervisors took 
retaliatory action against her shortly after she brought her disabilities to their attention and 
sought an accommodation. These allegations suffice to demonstrate a causal connection. U, 
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) ("A retaliatory 
purpose. can be shown indirectly by timing: protected activity followed closely in time by 
adverse employment action."). 
DOE's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs ADA retaliation claim will be denied. 
6. Hostile Work Environment 
Hostile work environment claims brought under the ADA are evaluated under the 
same standard as hostile work environment claims bought under Title VII. See, ~. Monterroso 
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v. Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, 591 F. Supp. 2d 567,584 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). To establish a hostile 
work environment claim, plaintiff "must show that 'the workplace is permeated with 
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment."' Littlejohn 
v. City ofN.Y., 795 F.3d 297,321 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 
17, 21 (1993)). "'The incidents complained of must be more than episodic; they must be 
sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive.'" Id. ( quoting Raspardo 
v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 2014)). In evaluating hostile work environment claims, 
courts consider the '"frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 
interferes with an employee's work performance."' Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 
154 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). 
DOE argues that Plaintiff "presents no facts alleging that she suffered any animus 
because of her disability." (Def. Br. (Dkt. No. 20) at 26) The Court agrees that Plaintiff has not 
adequately pled a hostile work environment claim. 
While Plaintiff alleges that the principals she worked for were aware of her 
disabilities, she has not pled facts showing that her "workplace is permeated with discriminatory 
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive." Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 
320-321. "'Hostile work environment claims are meant to protect individuals from abuse and 
trauma that is severe,"' Bermudez v. City ofN.Y., 783 F. Supp. 2d 560, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(quoting Ennis v. Sonitrol Mgmt. Corp., No. 02 Civ. 9070 (TPG), 2006 WL 177173, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2006)), and Plaintiff has not pled facts showing such severe abuse or trauma. 
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For example, Plaintiff claims that on "September 28, 2016, as a result of the ... 
hostile working conditions ... [she] was injured physically" when she had to "open[] a stairway 
exit door." (Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 8) ~ 42) But Plaintiff does not explain what the connection is 
between the alleged hostile working conditions and her opening of the heavy exit door. 
Similarly, Plaintiff claims that she was assigned no work on several occasions; that she was not 
given materials other teachers were given because she "was not a part of the permanent staff'; 
that a kindergarten teacher told her that she preferred substitute teachers to A TR teachers like 
her; and that she was subject to discipline. These allegations do not rise to the requisite level of 
severity. See,~, Rosario v. City ofN.Y., No., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29537, at *24-25 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2013) (dismissing hostile work environment claim because the conduct "did 
not include offensive language or physical contact" and was not "sufficiently pervasive"). 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs hostile work environment claim fails. 
III. STATE AND CITY LAW CLAIMS 
DOE has moved to dismiss Plaintiffs NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims, arguing 
that they are barred by New York Education Law § 3 813 ( 1 ), which requires a plaintiff bringing 
claims under these statutes to first file a written notice of claim within ninety days after the claim 
arises. N.Y. Educ. Law§ 3813(1). Plaintiff does not dispute that she did not file a notice of 
claim. Accordingly, Plaintiffs NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims must be dismissed . .E.,&, 
Birkholz v. City ofN.Y., No. 10 Civ. 4719 (NGG), 2012 WL 580522, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 
2012) (failure to plead "that notice of the claim has been served" is grounds for dismissal). 
IV. LEA VE TO AMEND 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that a plaintiff may amend her complaint "once as a 
matter of course before a responsive pleading is served." Otherwise, a plaintiff may do so only 
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with leave of court or consent of the adverse party, but "the court should freely give leave when 
justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, '"[w]here the proposed amended complaint 
would not withstand a motion to dismiss, the granting of leave to amend would be futile, and 
hence the motion [to amend] should be denied.'" Howard v. City of New York, No. 02 Civ. 
1731 (KMK), 2006 WL 2597857, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (quoting In re Winstar Commc'ns 
v. Rouhana, No. 01 Civ. 3014 (GBD), 2006 WL 473885, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.27, 2006)); see 
also Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 310 F.3d 243,258 (2d Cir. 2002) ("An amendment to a 
pleading is futile if the proposed claim could not withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)."). 
Because the Court cannot determine, at this stage of the proceedings, that any 
effort to amend would be futile, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend. Any motion to amend is to 
be filed by June 17, 2019. The proposed Second Amended Complaint is to be attached as an 
exhibit to the motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this Court granted in part and denied in part 
Defendant's motion to dismiss. 
The parties are directed to appear before the Court for an initial pretrial 
conference in accordance with Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on Thursday, 
June 13, 2019 at 10:15 a.m. in Courtroom 705 of the Thurgood Marshall United States 
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, New York. 
The parties are further directed to confer prior to the conference regarding all of 
the subjects to be considered pursuant to Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
to file a written report outlining their discovery plan pursuant to that Rule. The parties must also 
submit a joint letter addressing the following in separate paragraphs: (1) a brief description of 
the case, including the factual and legal bases for the claim(s) and defense(s); (2) any 
contemplated motions; and (3) the prospect for settlement. For the Court's convenience, the 
parties must set forth the conference's date and time in the joint letter's opening paragraph. The 
Court directs the parties to consult its Individual Practices and model Case Management Plan and 
Scheduling Order, both of which are available on the Court's web site. The written report 
outlining discovery and the joint letter must be filed at least three days prior to the initial pretrial 
conference with the Court. The parties shall send courtesy copies of that report and joint letter to 
the United States Courthouse, Chambers 2204, 40 Foley Square, New York, New York 10007. 
The Pro Se Office is a valuable resource in assisting litigants who proceed in 
federal court without the assistance of counsel. The Pro Se Office may be reached at: 
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Pro Se Clerk's Office 
Southern District of New York 
40 Foley Square 
New York, NY 10007 
(212) 805-0175 
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this memorandum opinion & 
order and this Court's March 31, 2019 order (Dkt. No. 26) to prose Plaintiff Jeannine Renee 
Lam, 4125 50th Street, Apt. SB, Woodside, NY 11377. 
Dated: New York, New York 
May 29, 2019 
SO ORDERED. 
United States District Judge 
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